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23. Compare, for instance, similar concerns that arise when we 
seek to make sense of human nature in a way that connects 
to morality regardless of whether we involve add-on virtual 
or non-virtual parts.
24. See Coleman, Hello Avatar, chapter 4: “Presence.”
25. Dibbell, “Rape in Cyberspace.”
26. Coleman, Hello Avatar, 47.
27. Thanks to William Kline for challenging me on this point in 
an early discussion.
28. Fox, “Woman Uses Thought Control.”
29. I aim this also as a response to an anonymous reviewer’s 
question about whether the harm of a virtual rape crosses 
the virtual border to cause real harm to the avatar’s driver.
30. Bujega, “Avatar Rape.”
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A Philosophy of the Web
Sidey Myoo
Jagiellonian University, Krakow
Computers, too, lead us to construct things in new 
ways. With computers we can simulate nature in 
a program or leave nature aside and build second 
natures limited only by our powers of imagination 
and abstraction. The objects on the screen have no 
simple physical referent. In this sense, life on the 
screen is without origins and foundation. It is a place 
where signs taken for reality may substitute for the 
real. Its aesthetic has to do with manipulation and 
recombination. 
– Sherry Turkle, Life on the screen.
Identity In the Age of Internet
What I’m saying is that you have to think about 
technology, you have to use it, because in the end it 
is in your blood. Technology will move in and speak 
through you, like it or not. Best not to ignore.
– Tim Etchells, Certain Fragments: Contemporary 
Performance and Forced Entertainment
Introduction
My aim is to propose broad outlines for a philosophy of the 
web, after which I will provide a description of the Academia 
Electronica, a type of online university, as an illustration of how 
the philosophical ideas outlined may be applied on a practical 
level. In particular, I will describe the Academia Electronica 
in the context of an ontological postulation with respect to 
electronic reality regarded as a sphere of being. What underlies 
my choice of subject matter is philosophical reflection on 
human engagement with the web, the type of activity engaged 
in, and the time spent on the web. The main idea is that the 
creation of one’s own personal space on the web and the 
intensity of communication mean that these phenomena 
cannot be considered unreal and therefore cannot be described 
as, for example, artificial.
I decided on this dual approach for the article since I 
recognize that theoretical analysis is not necessarily adequate or 
convincing if it fails to entail real consequences. A philosophy of 
the web requires statements concerning genuine human activity 
in the electronic reality as well as ontological propositions on 
this sphere of being, unless someone who spends hours each 
day working at a computer insists that they are engaged in 
something artificial or unreal, or an imitation of reality. 
A story
Late one night, deeply immersed in the electronic world 
of Second Life, I made my way to the coast to spend a few 
moments on the beach before leaving the online world. On 
the interface I switched the time to sunset and sat back in a 
deckchair. After a while, a woman (from Holland, as I recall) 
came up to me and after a short, customary greeting told me 
that she had just become homeless. At first I was puzzled as 
to how someone sitting at a computer could be homeless; 
however, it turned out that the home in question was not a 
physical one but one she had built with her Second Life husband 
and had been living in for the previous nine months. Quite apart 
from her relationship in Second Life, where she spent time every 
day and had a child (a bot), she was married in the physical 
world. On the day I met her, her Second Life relationship had 
come to an end and she had, in that sense, become homeless.
A philosophy of the web
This story goes some way to explaining my understanding of the 
philosophical issues relating to the ontology of electronic being 
and the human person. In general terms, this subject matter 
arises out of the fact that humans are increasingly active on 
the web, both quantitatively and qualitatively; their attention is 
drawn to it and they find ever more content within it, frequently 
at the expense of certain forms of being in the physical world. 
This is not to say that I regard online phenomena merely as 
modes of communication utilitarian in character, but rather 
as having the nature of real human activity with an ontological 
and anthropological dimension. Since I regard online events 
as being just as important, authentic, and real as those in the 
physical world, I use concepts of both electronic and physical 
reality. I attach particular importance to worlds created by 
means of interactive 3D graphics; thus, what I have in mind 
when I refer to “the electronic world” is an electronic reality 
in which people gather for no other reason than to participate 
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and where one’s motives for spending time are existential. I 
emphasize the significance of electronic worlds because they 
have the power to assimilate various kinds of human activity, at 
which point they become of interest to the philosopher.
By “world,” I mean just that: a place with earth and 
sky, rivers and trees, deserts and meadows, with a sun 
that makes regular trips across the horizon, a moon 
that crests in its passing, and most of all the natural 
elements that quietly comprise a place: gravity and 
wind, and an ocean that responds to both. All of this, 
depicted on the computer monitor before you. There 
are people there, too.1
I propose a philosophy of the web as a branch of philosophy 
combining all its various strands. Furthermore, I acknowledge 
that analysis of online phenomena is fundamental to 
understanding humankind and the world in the present day, 
and that there is indeed an onus on philosophy to explain these 
phenomena at a more fundamental level than would be the case 
for other fields of learning. This involves directing philosophical 
analysis to electronic reality and the technology with which it is 
so thoroughly imbued, which means understanding philosophy 
as the science of technological imponderables. I would 
argue that the analysis and constant re-evaluation of these 
phenomena is incumbent on the humanities in their relationship 
with humanity, which, finding itself in an ever more intimate 
coexistence with technology, does not necessarily perceive 
the profound changes taking place, seeing their invasiveness 
and paradigmaticality as utility. We work, spend time, and have 
emotional experiences in both realities, and the activity and 
meaning which we bring into effect and to which we are subject 
are equally real to us in either: people and things are capable 
of authentic and real existence in both spheres. 
 Technology is taking over many aspects of human life, 
enveloping us in a constantly expanding, complementary 
sphere, both in the electronic reality of the web and in the 
physical world in the form of smart appliances. It is, I believe, 
illusory to regard computers merely as tools, and even 
erroneous since the computer (the interface) is actually the 
gateway to another world:
Thus, image becomes image-interface. In this role it 
functions as a portal into another world, like an icon in 
the Middle Ages or a mirror in modern literature and 
cinema. Rather than staying on its surface, we expect 
to go “into” the image.2
The computer may be seen more abstractly as an evolving 
device, constantly enhancing its possibilities. From this 
perspective, a personal computer becomes not just a concrete 
object but the manifestation of a technology at a particular stage 
of its development. This involves understanding technology 
as developing at an incomparably faster pace than other 
fields, giving rise to futurological extrapolations that further 
development of technology will bring in its wake manifest 
consequences for humanity.3 Statements such as: In the future, 
processors and computers will be faster, should be regarded 
as reasonable extrapolations and not casual opinions of no 
scientific consequence. In evolutionary history, technological 
development goes on unabated, and with each technological 
advance, humanity is systematically alienated from the natural 
world, which itself is being transformed into an artifact by the 
power of technology.
The fundamental philosophical questions to be resolved 
are: What constitutes reality in the contemporary world? How 
should philosophy relate to various kinds of reality: physical, 
electronic, immaterial, or a hybrid form of being? What is the 
value of gaining access to the web through various devices, 
subsequently spending hours on end online, and benefiting 
from continuity of communication? Which ontological 
categories should be assigned to immaterial, electronic forms 
of being that have their origins in the physical world, and how 
should their value be assessed?
Let us leave behind the bimodal reality as described in 
two different ontologies. I do not intend to discuss issues of 
augmentalism and immersionism, although I have reservations 
about augmentalism precisely because it has its roots in two 
different ontologies. Immersionism, on the other hand, assumes 
the transfer of intentionality from the physical to the electronic 
world while partially inhibiting certain types of activity, for 
example, sensory, in the latter. I am not sure how to understand 
the concept of extending the boundaries of the physical world 
when it might rather be a case of adding the ontologically 
different electronic space to the physical world. Buechner’s 
remarks concerning the alterity between physical and electronic 
being in the context of augmentalism are intuitive:
The claim of this paper is that one kind of augmented 
reality is philosophically incoherent. That is, there 
are a priori reasons to believe that it cannot happen. 
It is not that the concept makes sense, but is either 
physically or technologically unachievable. Rather, 
the very concept is incoherent. It is metaphysically 
impossible. [. . .] My claim is not about limitations of 
the physical world, but rather about the concept of 
reality augmentation and the metaphysical limitations 
imposed by a philosophical theory of fictional entities.4
Intuitive propositions that web-based phenomena may be 
regarded as a type of reality began to appear in the literature in 
the 1970s. Although they grasped the sense of reality arising from 
the development of electronics, they were still deeply rooted 
in the idea of electronic reality being something artificial and 
unreal. This approach doubtless arose from a deep-seated and 
ontologically weak understanding of virtual reality as something 
unsubstantial and ephemeral rather than as a distinct and 
ontologically convincing form of being, an example of which 
is someone claiming that he possesses virtual money. This 
might, for example, mean that the individual in question has 
been promised money, which, not yet being in their possession, 
is, in a certain sense, non-existent; or it may refer to money 
which the individual really possesses in their account but which 
exists electronically rather than physically. Thus, an ontological 
distinction can be made between virtual and electronic: virtual 
money is not real and is not held in an account but which is, 
for example, expected; money held electronically rather than 
physically in an account, on the other hand, is real rather than 
virtual.
 Historical, yet significant on account of her position on 
the ontology of electronic forms of being, are the findings of 
Sherry Turkle, which stem largely from psychological analysis:
What is real? That question may take many forms. 
What are we willing to count as real? What do our 
models allow us to see as real? To what degree are we 
willing to take simulations for reality? How do we keep 
a sense that there is a reality distinct from simulation? 
Would that sense be itself an illusion?5
In an ontological sense, the emergence of virtual reality can be 
traced to Myron Krueger in the early 1970s. However, in common 
with other contemporary views (virtual realism, Michael Heim; 
virtual realm, Margaret Morse; new nature of reality, Nicole 
Stenger; parallel universe, Michael Benedikt; cyber world, Hans 
Moravec; work space, Steve Pruitt; computer culture, Dave 
Healy; virtual community, Howard Rheingold), he failed to 
grasp the full ontological meaning which would have enabled 
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him to understand electronic reality as a sphere of being. 
Moreover, Krueger also made use of another idea, artificial 
reality, which actually militated against ontological analysis 
since it introduced the notion of artificiality. Nevertheless, in 
my estimation Myron Krueger came closer to seeing virtuality 
as reality in the ontological sense than any other theoreticians 
I am familiar with who also entertained intuitions in this area. 
What he lacked, in my opinion, was philosophical analysis, 
which would have placed his intuitions on electronic reality 
on the level of philosophical categories.6
Once we accept the realness of electronic reality, 
apart from fundamental ontological issues, there are also 
anthropological ramifications. A person can simply become 
addicted to communicating or being in electronic reality. 
Rejecting this situation may give rise to technological exclusion. 
Giving up using a cell phone or emails can lead to an existential 
bubble in which one is soon faced with limitations such as 
the inability to communicate with others: “The concern has 
been that if we are spending more time in virtual rather than 
in face-to-face communication, our weak ties may grow but 
strong ties shrink.”7
The expanding sphere of electronic being makes various 
kinds of online experience possible. I regard such experiences 
as the natural development of events in the life of the modern 
individual: by this I mean a philosophical interpretation 
connected with, for example, self-creation; in other words, the 
emergence of an online identity or the existence of knowledge 
as transcendent in the shared electronic sphere of being.8
When an individual enters the online world, particularly 
a graphic 3D environment, one discovers a space for self-
creation and can begin to effect changes which also extend 
to one’s physical existence. And here lies the essential point: 
an individual can exist in electronic reality in new and diverse 
ways. This is the difference between instant messaging and 
the electronic world. Depending on technological possibilities, 
an individual can introduce various content online, the most 
important element of which is one’s emotions. There are also 
axiological implications: values, which may be present in 
any form of human reality, have the same meaning as when 
originally encountered in the physical world. Thus, in electronic 
reality an individual can find a world of feelings and spiritual 
values, such as truth and falsehood, which are not established 
by a particular kind of reality but by an individual’s activity within 
it. The value system that an individual encounters in electronic 
reality can also suggest choices to which they will be subject. 
Two questions arise from this. The first relates to the fact that 
an individual can see on the screen what they are saying or 
how they appear in the form and behavior of their avatar; 
this may lead them to modify their actions and learn from the 
experience since it is crucial for them to exist in electronic 
reality. In order to maintain positive activity within a nonlinear 
structure of contacts, such behavior is necessary to eliminate 
negative values. This is quite distinctive since technology creates 
situations that cannot exist in the physical world, which is 
mainly due to nonlinearity and the ease with which emotions 
can be expressed online. The second question has to do with 
situations where an individual easily becomes emotional, 
which may or may not give them a sense of the significance of 
the value experienced and of responsibility for their behavior. 
This is a rather common experience in electronic reality when 
an individual is faced with choices straddling the physical and 
electronic worlds. If an existential balance between the two 
worlds is not maintained, someone who has important issues 
in the physical world can easily be faced with similar issues in 
the electronic world and will have to make choices between 
the two.
I argue that it is in being virtual that we are human. 
Virtual worlds reconfigure selfhood and sociality, but 
this is only possible because they rework the virtuality 
that characterizes human being in the actual world.9
This involves both the psychic and the corporeal: 
A virtual being has mystery—that of the coevolution 
of man and machine, that of the redefinition of the 
body, of the organic, and of evolution. A virtual being 
is a perception that is alive.10
An important factor is self-expression, which in the 3D world 
begins with the physical appearance of the avatar. The individual 
goes about the electronic world in a form they have created 
themselves and with a name they have given themselves, 
capable of making friends or falling in love. Being in the 
electronic world becomes very pleasurable when, as a matter 
of course, one can access a space where all the problems of 
the physical world have been removed. Continual participation 
in an environment like Second Life can turn into an authentic 
existence.
The moment we accept the electronic environment as a 
sphere of being and an alternative reality to the physical world, 
the events and experiences of the physical world can take on 
a credible and valuable form in electronic reality. Things really 
happen, but just differently from in the physical world because 
they are governed by a different ontology. Unless the electronic 
sphere is recognized as a type of human reality in its own right, 
each activity in the electronic reality will to some extent be 
seen as separated from the physical world but complementary 
to it; it will never attain its fullness but remain a hybrid whose 
essence is to be found in the physical world. The fundamental 
point here is one’s philosophical attitude to the world. Without, 
at this stage, going into the possibility of affirming the existence 
of any particular reality, the individual lives with some sort of 
conviction about the existence of the physical world and has 
no need to cogitate on the matter: that is for philosophers. A 
similar conviction is also in evidence when I affirm the existence 
of electronic reality. It is something I accept and seek to 
substantiate as a developing sphere of being, doing so from the 
perspective of a philosopher living in the contemporary world.
For the past three decades, I have been fascinated 
with the construction of identity and how it affects 
culture: the symbiotic relationship between the real 
and the virtual, and how identity reacts and shifts when 
processed through manipulated time.11
One day I realized that what I was doing in electronic reality 
amounted to genuine engagement. This intuition led to the 
setting up of online university courses in the form of Academia 
Electronica in Second Life.12
The idea of academism
In this section of the article I would like to illustrate the practical 
dimension of a philosophy of the web. To this end, I will describe 
the Academia Electronica, a non-institutional university in 
Second Life in which I have run official, academic lectures 
for five years. Apart from lecture courses, individual lectures 
are also given by invited guests as well as undergraduate and 
postgraduate students. Most of the lectures are archived in 
the form of audio recordings on the academy’s website. The 
Academia Electronica embodies the idea of academism in that 
it extends and diversifies the content of academic life possible 
in e-learning.
 The academy is mainly concerned with examining the 
multifarious issues that arise when the electronic environment 
is regarded as a sphere of human reality. It describes electronic 
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reality from the perspectives of philosophy, cultural studies, 
sociology, psychology, and other disciplines. While the academy 
provides a platform for discussing philosophy, it itself is a subject 
of philosophical enquiry and a laboratory of the humanities. It 
asks whether electronic being can really exist and an online 
identity really be created, and whether values can exist in a 
nonlinear system of human communication.
I chose Second Life firstly because I realized that it is 
the best form of electronic reality: an electronic world in 
which various aspects of academic life can be present; 
and secondly because I am convinced that technological 
development will affect the quality and length of online 
participation, especially in electronic worlds, leading to ever 
more widespread avatarization. Avatarization indicates a state 
of affairs that enables individuals, in the form of their avatar, to 
engage in unrestricted activity in electronic reality (including 
professionally), to maintain other contacts, and to possess 
goods. I also realized that Second Life is the best method of 
academic contact since it not only enables communication 
with students but, by its very nature, allows the expression and 
exchange of views. For example, part of my contact with Masters 
and PhD students is through Second Life. This sometimes takes 
place in the evening, often around a campfire. I believe such 
conversations can be more effective than institutional meetings 
in a physical university where the environment itself (being in 
the professor’s study and being faced with the barrier of the 
professor’s desk) determines the nature of contact, potentially 
inhibiting the student from engaging in philosophically inspired 
free expression of their views through being too conscious of 
the institutional surroundings in which they find themselves.13 
I have also noticed that chat room messages inspired during 
a lecture can contain insights that may form the basis for the 
development of the student’s own future theories. Since these 
insights arise while the lecture is in progress, they may, at the 
request of students, result in the lecture continuing on a different 
track or turning into a seminar. What is remarkable is the 
development of a rapport between the members of the group 
arising out of the instant messaging taking place concurrently 
with the lecture by students who are visible to each other in the 
form of their avatars; this would be impossible in the physical 
world since it would disrupt the lecture.
A university in the electronic world should be a place where 
academic life can take its course. Therefore, it is essential to 
develop land with buildings and other elements conducive to 
an academic atmosphere in Second Life. At various times art 
galleries have been set up, which I also make use of during 
physical lectures, going into the Academia and observing the 
exhibits with students (at present there is a gallery of twentieth-
century art and another of photographs). There are also concert 
halls with performances of streamed and live music. This is 
made possible by advances in 3-D technology; what matters 
here is not communication or visual images but engagement 
in the electronic space.14
The electronic university changes the teacher-student 
relationship, starting with students creating avatars for 
themselves and adopting online names, which they use 
whenever they make contact. When students engage in 
academic activity, they are entitled to manage the buildings 
and grounds, but in so doing they assume responsibility for 
academic property. It is also important that when they visit 
Second Life, they are, to a certain extent, representing the 
Academia in particular and the academic world in general, 
which places certain obligations and responsibilities upon them.
The question of trust and responsibility is fundamental as 
it is concerned with the existence on the web of a university, 
a different kind of place and one that is respectful of the 
academic world. It is important for the university to observe 
the principle of openness (open lectures, events fostering an 
academic community, continuous access, and the opportunity 
for creativity), while at the same time maintaining its status. If 
it intends to exist as a university in the electronic world, where 
individuals create their own, often private worlds, realize their 
dreams, and occasionally experience that life to the fullest, 
then every effort must be made to create an appropriate space 
for them. It is important that the university be accepted in the 
electronic world, while at the same time becoming a point 
of reference and center for different kinds of activity brought 
to the electronic world by others. There is clearly a place for 
a university in the electronic world as there is for any kind of 
activity. When a university is transposed to the electronic world, 
certain features are bound to be different when compared with 
academia in the physical world. These changes result from 
the different ontological reality prevailing in the electronic 
world. For example, appearing in the form of an avatar affects 
interaction between individuals, while university buildings and 
lecture theaters need not resemble their physical counterparts 
at all, bringing an air of innovation to the conduct of lectures. 
This entirely new quality, based on electronic reality, arises 
instantaneously and in a manner requiring a particular response. 
Since 2007, almost 200 students have officially completed 
courses and several dozen lectures have been given by 
invited academics. In addition, numerous artistic and popular 
educational events have taken place. I believe that these kinds 
of academic activities point towards the university of the future, 
which will be first and foremost a place rather than a mosaic 
of lectures.
In June 2012, two historic events in Polish e-learning took 
place at the Academia Electronica. June 6 saw the first public 
defense of a doctoral dissertation, titled Computer Games in the 
Perspective of the Anthropology of Everyday Life) by Radosław 
Bomba (RL)/Radel Bailey (SL), doctoral advisor Andrzej 
Radomski (RL)/An Redinamus (SL), Maria Curie-Skłodowska 
University, Lublin. On June 22, the first defense of a masters 
dissertation, titled The Existence of Responsibility on the Web, 
was made by Aleksandra Budzisz (RL)/Skrzydlatamara (SL), 
masters advisor Sidey Myoo, Jagiellonian University, Krakow. 
Both events were recorded and are available on the Academia 
website.
The Academia Electronica owes its existence to the 
engagement of those with no professional connection with the 
university but who give of their technical expertise to maintain 
its proper functioning, including the website.
Every Monday since 2007 (except during the summer 
vacation), I enter the electronic world for a few hours, halting my 
activities in the physical world. Activity in the electronic world 
can be directed toward any reality or person one wishes. These 
worlds are mutually exclusive with regard to their ontologies 
and how time is spent in them: the individual is of paramount 
importance; the worlds are secondary.
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Frederick Schauer’s attention has recently been drawn to 
defeasibility in a paper with a provocative title: “Is Defeasibility 
an Essential Property of Law?”1 The crisis of confidence for 
Schauer appears to take hold about the time he reviews Nicola 
Lacey’s biography of H. L. A. Hart.2 Schauer actually finds room 
for defeasibility in a legal system, along the lines of judicial 
nullification of rule-derived legal guidance. He permits an 
ethical override of the logic and language of law, as a strongly 
desirable power granted the wise jurist in a system that is truly 
justice-seeking.
The most significant push for defeasibility has been felt in 
the community that has attempted to model legal reasoning 
with computer programs. The AI (artificial intelligence) and 
Law community, an international group of interdisciplinarians, 
visited the concept of defeasibility two decades ago. In fact, 
defeasibility has become so entrenched in AI and Law that the 
development of defeasible reasoning has advanced formally 
and mathematically within this milieux. Henry Prakken, for 
example, a lecturer in the Intelligent Systems Group of the 
computer science department at Utrecht University, and 
professor of law and IT at the Law Faculty of the University of 
Groningen, wrote his 1993 thesis at Free University Amsterdam, 
titled Logical Tools for Modelling Legal Argument. In 2002, 
he would be invited to write the review article “Logics for 
Defeasible Argumentation” with Gerard Vreeswijk for the 
Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Defeasible logic has also 
benefitted from the theses at Maastricht’s law school by a 
mathematician, Bart Verheij, Dialectical Argumentation with 
Argumentation Schemes: An Approach to Legal Logic, and a 
computer scientist, Arno Lodder, DiaLaw: On Legal Justification 
and Dialogical Models of Argumentation. Verheij’s advisor, 
Jaap Hage, a legal philosopher, added Reasoning with Rules: 
An Essay on Legal Reasoning and Its Underlying Logic. Those 
are just some of the Dutch researchers. Prominent proponents 
of defeasibility can be found in the AI and Law community 
from Italy, Argentina, Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, 
France, Canada, Thailand, China, Japan, and the United States.
Apparently the desire to explain legal reasoning in enough 
detail that a computer system could be designed around the 
explanation has led many researchers to “dialogical defeasible 
argumentation,” regardless of prior logical or legal tradition.
Yet, Schauer has apparently lost the will to defend the very 
defeasibility he found so interesting in his 1993 Playing By the 
Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-
Making in Law and in Life. Like H. L. A. Hart himself, who 
introduced defeasibility to the Western philosophical vernacular, 
then nearly disavowed defeasibility in the introduction to his 
collected works, there has been a noticeable retreat.3
Those of us tasked with designing actual systems of 
symbol manipulation that perform quasi-legal reasoning 
remain steadfast in our appraisal of defeasibility as a useful 
design paradigm. The purpose of this short note is to briefly 
review the main places in the analysis of legal reasoning where 
defeasibility finds its use.
Before I enumerate, it is worth remembering some history. 
Defeasibility entered artificial intelligence and computer 
modeling in the storm that was “non-monotonic logic,” an 
idea that occupied a Rockefeller-sized fraction of the AI 
field’s intellectual investment at its peak. Rationalization of 
this situation came slowly, as epistemologically oriented 
philosophers such as John Pollock and Henry Kyburg began 
to weigh in. The philosophical tradition remains a moderating 
partner, while non-monotonic logicians, especially adherents 
to “default logic,” continue with their creative flows. Pollock 
was influenced by Roderick Chisholm through John Ladd, 
but he always claimed he was trying to interpret Wittgenstein 
directly (although Waismann might be an equally good locus 
focus for Pollock’s pre-formal work). Wittgenstein also inspired 
Jon Doyle, author of AI’s truth-maintenance system, one of the 
major breaks from the attempt to do non-monotonic reasoning 
as a kind of modal belief logic.
In an era of renewed US interest in Constitution and 
secession, it is worth remembering that “indefeasible” was a 
popular high note of the classically trained rhetorician, especially 
when drawing a line in the sand: in the 1776 Virginia Declaration 
of Rights, “community hath an indubitable, inalienable, and 
indefeasible right to reform, alter or abolish government . . .” 
(attributed to James Madison); and John Adams: “The people 
